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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SCC'n 1. THEURER, D.M.C., * 
Emclever No. 1-082690-1, 
Petitioner, ADDENDUM 
* 
vs. 
* Supreme Court No. 20903 
BOA_-L Cr REVIEW, 
INE'VSIRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,* 
Respondent. * 
ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
1. decision of the Board of Review 
2. "endings and Conclusions 
3. 7-ah Code Annotated, Section 35-4-7 (c)(1)(C) (1953 as 
trended)(in pertinent part) 
4. Zcr.rinental Telephone Company of Utah v. State Tax Commission 
tf Utah, 539 P.2d 447 (1975) 
5. "C"inental Oil Company of Utah v. Board of Review of the 
I.-.dustrial Commission of Utah, 568 P.2d 727 (Utah, 1977) 
6. rLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p 41 (Rev. 4th Ed. 1968) 
DEC 191985 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Tabl 
BOARD OF REVIEW 
The Industrial Commission of U«,ah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
LLN/KM/KAZ/mgn 
SCOn L. THEURER, DMC 
Employer No. 1-082690-1 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Case No. 85-A-2231 
DECISION 
Case No. 85-BR-411 
After careful consideration of the record and testimony 1n the 
above-entitled matter, the Board of Review finds the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge to be fair and unbiased and supported by com-
petent evidence and, therefore, affirms such decision holding Dr. Scott L. 
Theurer, DMD, as a successor to Dr. Steve S. Larson pursuant to $35-4~7{c) 
(1)(C) of the Utah Employment Security Act. In so holding, the Board of 
Review hereby adopts the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 
J 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mail-
ing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with the Utah 
Supreme Court at the State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, within 
ten days after this decision becomes final. To file an appeal with the 
Supreme Court, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for 
Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35-4-10(1) 
of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing Statement and 
a Legal Brief. 
.BOARD OF REV 
Dated this 5th day of September, 1985. 
Date Mailed: September 10, 1985. 
nm^ 
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,rE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAh 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Section 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
Scott L. Theurer, DMD 
150 East 200 North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Employer No. 
Case No. 
J82690-1 
84-A-2231 
APPEAL FILED: March 20, 1985 DATE OF HEARING: May 22, 1985 
APPEARANCES: Employer PLACE OF HEARING: Logan, Utah 
The decision review representative's decision issued on March 11, 1985 held 
Dr. Scott Theurer as successor to Dr. Steven Larson. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Scott L. Theurer, DMD began a dentistry practice in Logan on or about July 1, 
1984. Dr. Theurer acquired assets for his business from Dr. Steven S. Larson. 
Dr. Larson discontinued his practice in Logan and moved out of state. Dr.-
Theurer purchased dental equipment from Dr. Larson for the amount $52,750. 
Dr. Larson retained various hand tools, casting machine, etc valued by Dr.-
Theurer to be approximately $4,000. Dr. Larson also retained his accounts 
receivable valued by Dr. Theurer at approximately $41,206. Dr. Theurer con-
tracted with Dr. Larson to lease the premises which Dr. Larson previously 
occupied for his practice. Dr. Larson owns the premises. The value of this 
premises is estimated as $66,000. Dr. Theurer also made a lease agreement with 
Dr. Larson to lease the Lewiston office and equipment valued at $10,000. At the 
time of transition between Dr. Larson and Dr. Theurer1s practice, Dr. Theurer 
estimated Dr. Larson's assets at $173,956. Dr. Theurer paid Dr. Larson a total 
of $55,000. The purchase price represents 30% of the value of the assets owned 
and operated by Dr. Larson in his practice. 
The total purchase price included dental equipment and a letter of introduc-
tion. The letter of introduction informed Dr. Larson's patients that Dr. Larson 
was leaving the area and recommended Dr. Theurer to continue with providing their 
dental care. 
The purchase agreement between the two doctors also contained a restrictive 
covenant that Dr. Larson would not practice general dentistry within twenty-five 
miles for period of five years. When Dr. Theurer acquired Dr. Larson's practice 
there were approximately 1300 active patients of record. Dr. Theurer estimated 
approximately 100 patients left in preference of a different dentist. Approxi-
mately seven to nine hundred have retained Dr. Theurer's services and 200 are of 
unknown status. Dr. Theurer obtained approximately 300 additional new patients. 
Dr. Scott L. Theurer, DMD -2- 1-082690-1 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION 
Section 35-4-7(c)(l)(C) of the Utah Employment Security Act states that if an 
employer has acquired all or substantially all of the assets of another employer 
and the other employer had discontinued operations upon the acquisition,. . . the 
benefit costs of both employers and the payrolls of both employers during the 
qualifying period shall be jointly considered for the purpose of determining and 
establishing the acquiring parties qualifications for experience rating class-
ification. 
Dr. Theurer argues he shouldn't be considered as an accessor employer because he 
only purchased 30% of Dr. Larson's assets. The language in the act does not 
state purchase. The word "acquired" is used. Acquired is different from 
purchase. To acquire means obtain something by any means. The acquire would 
include purchasing, but isn't restricted to such. To acquire all or substantial-
ly all assets encompasses any lawful means of obtaining the assets. This would 
include purchasing, leasing, inheriting, etc. 
A preponderance of the evidence shows Dr. Theurer purchasing or leasing the 
majority of the assets of Dr. Larson's dental practice. Dr. Theurer acquired the 
majority of Dr. Larson's assets for the continuation of the dental practice. 
Dr. Theurer acquired approximately 75% of Dr. Larson's practice by either 
purchase or lease agreement; the majority of assets needed for the continuation 
of a dental practice. Dr. Theurer succeeding Dr. Larson is further evident by 
the buying and issuance of a letter of recommendation which allowed Dr. Theurer 
to retain the majority of Dr. Larson's patients. Had Dr. Theurer started his 
practice without Dr. Larson's clientele he would have obtained only approximately 
300 patients, which is only a fraction of the clientele he inherited with the 
acquisition of Dr. Larson's dental practice. The complete acquisition of 
Dr. Larson's dental practice is further demonstrated by the restrictive clause 
prohibiting Dr. Larson from practicing within a twenty-five mile radius for five 
years. Dr. Theurer acquired substantially all the assets of Dr. Larson's dental 
practice. As such, the benefit costs and payrolls from Dr. Larson's practice 
should be used in determining Dr. Theurer's contribution experience rate. 
DECISION 
The decision review representative's decision dated March 11, 1985 holding 
Dr. Theurer as a successor to Dr. Larson pursuant to Section 35-4-7(c)(l)(C) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act is affirmed. 
^ Kenneth yc. Major>^ 
Administrative Law 3uage 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless with ten days from June 19, 1985, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
j i 
cc: Kevin E. Kane, Daines 4 Kane 
Tab 3 
the computation date on or after January 1,1985. A qualified employer who 
after March 31 pays all required contributions shall, for the current 
contribution year, be assigned a rate based upon his own experience as 
provided under the experience rating provisions of this act effective the first 
day of the calendar quarter in which the payment was made. Delinquency in 
filing contribution reports shall not be the basis for denial of a rate less than 
t h e ^ x i r r x ^ c ^ n t r i h u ^ ^ e , ^
 a s ^ ^ ( i n p e r t i r i e n t p £ r 
If an employer has acquired all or substantially all the assets of another 
employer and the other employer had discontinued operations upon the 
acquisition, the period of liability with respect to the filing of contribution 
reports, the payment of contributions, after January 1, 1985, the benefit 
costs of both employers, and the payrolls of both employers during the 
qualifying period shall be jointly considered for the purpose of determining 
and establishing the acquiring party's qualifications for an experience rating 
classification. The transferring employer shall be divested of his payroll 
experience. 
When an employer or prospective employer has acquired an operating 
department, section, division, or any substantial portion of the business or 
assets of any employer which is clearly segregable and identifiable, the entire 
payroll experience, and benefit costs after January 1, 1985, of the 
transferring employer shall be divided between the transferring and 
acquiring employers in proportion to the payroll for the four preceding 
completed calendar quarters attributable to the operating assets conveyed 
and retained. The rate of the acquiring employer for the current contri-
bution year shall be that rate which is assigned under regulations of the 
commission. 
Any employing unit or prospective employing unit which acquires all or 
part of the payroll experience of an employer shall, for all purposes of this 
act, be an employer as of the date of acquisition. 
When an employer, as provided in this subsection, has been divested of 
his payroll experience by transferring all of his business to another and by 
ceasing operations as of the date of the transfer, the transferring employer 
shall, notwithstanding section 35-4-8, cease to be an employer, as defined by 
this act, as of the date of transfer. 
(D) "Reserve" means that amount of money in the fund exclusive of 
moneys transferred to the fund under the Federal Employment Security 
Administrative Financing Act of 1954, which have been appropriated or are 
subject to appropriation by the state legislature. 
(E) "Total wages" means all remuneration paid by an employer to 
employees for insured work. 
(F) "Contribution year" means any calendar year beginning on 
January 1 and ending on December 31. 
23 
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CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE COMPANY 
OF UTAH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendant. 
Nos. 13842, 13843. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Aiur. 13, 1073 
Local tel one companies, which 
were subsidiarity of nationwide telephone 
corporation, sought reversal of Tax Com-
mission's decision partially disallowing 
claimed deductions for federal transfer 
payments made to parent corporation. The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that un-
der statutes which provide for allocation of 
income and deductions between several 
corporations controlled by same interests 
and which permit deduction for taxes paid, 
local telephone companies could only de-
duct from state income proportionate share 
of federal taxes actually paid by parent 
nonresident corporation, which in comput-
ing total federal taxes due could deduct 
losses of subsidiary corporations, and not 
amount of federal transfer payments for-
warded by subsidiary to parent. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, C. J., concurred in result. 
1. Statutes C=>245 
While general rule as to taxing stat-
utes is that they are construed strictly 
against taxing authority and favorably to 
taxpayer, the reverse is true as to provi-
sions allowing deductions. 
2. Statutes 0 2 4 5 
In accordance with rule that deduc-
tions are allowed as matter of grace and 
therefore should be strictly construed, tax-
payer claiming deduction is required to 
show that his claim is fairly and clearly al-
lowable under relevant statute. 
3. Statutes O I 8 4 
Where there is doubt or uncertainty 
concerning interpretation and application 
of statutes, they should be viewed in light 
• »i the conditions and 
ihey aie intended tu 
sought to be obtained therebv. 
«47 
necessities which 
meet and objects 
A. Taxation OI005, 1031 
Statute providing for allocation of in-
come and deduction between several corpo-
rations controlled by same interests author-
izes the Tax Commission to so apportion 
income and deductions of corporations 
within controlled groups as to fairly and 
equitably reflect income earned in Utah. 
U.C.A.1953, 59-13-17. 
5. Taxation C= I^046 
Statutes which provide for allocation 
of income and deductions between several 
corporations controlled by same interests 
and which permit deduction for taxes paid, 
do not contemplate that federal transfer 
payments made by resident corporation to 
nonresident parent corporation be consid-
ered as proper deductions from state in-
come unless such payments are actually 
paid to federal government. U.C.A.1953, 
59-13-7, 59-13-17. 
6. Taxation <§=>I046 
Under statutes which provide for allo-
cation of income and deductions between 
several corporations controlled by same in-
terests and which permit deduction from 
state income of taxes paid, local telephone 
companies could only deduct proportionate 
share of federal taxes actually paid by par-
ent nonresident corporation, which in com-
puting total taxes due could deduct losses 
of subsidiary corporations, and not amount 
of federal transfer payments forwarded by 
local companies to parent, from state in-
come. U.C.A.1953, 59-13-7, 59-13-17. 
Merrill R. Weech, John W. Horsley, of 
Movie & Draper, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff' 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for defendant. 
Merrill R. Weech and Larry C. Holman, 
of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 
Salt Lake City, for Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., amicus curiae. 
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CROCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiffs, Midland Telephone Com-
pany, providing service in Grand County, 
and Utah Telephone Company,1 providing 
service in Box Elder County, are both sub-
sidiaries of Continental Telephone Corpo-
ration, a corporation with nationwide oper-
ations. They claimed as deductions on 
their Utah tax returns, payments trans-
ferred to Continental in connection with 
the preparation and payment of consolidat-
ed federal tax returns for the tax years 
1965 through 1970. The Tax Commission 
partially disallowed plaintiffs' claimed de-
ductions for payment of federal income 
taxes, by reducing the deductions allowable 
for the federal transfer payments to Conti-
nental to the proportion that plaintiffs' 
federal taxable income bears to the total 
amount of federal taxes actually paid by 
Continental. Plaintiffs seek reversal of 
the Tax Commission's decision and full al-
lowance on their state returns of the 
amounts they paid to Continental. 
Plaintiffs contend that the deductions 
taken by them for payment of federal tax-
es are expressly authorized by Section 59-
13-7, U.C.A.1953, quoted below; and that 
the deduction and allocation made by the 
Tax Commission is not justified either un-
der Section 59-13-17, U.C.A.1953, or Utah 
Corporation Franchise Tax Regulation 13, 
upon which the Commission based its ac-
tion. 
Continental Telephone Corporation, the 
parent corporation, is headquartered in 
Washington, D. C. It has a large number 
of operating telephone utilities as subsidi-
aries as well as some non-utility subsidi-
aries and operates in 42 states and several 
foreign countries. The subsidiaries here 
involved, Midland and Utah Telephone 
Companies, operate within and derive all 
their income within this State. This i-s so 
reported on their tax returns in question. 
They are also subject to the regulation and 
supervision of the Utah Public Service 
I. After t''<- t \ .\<\i!'- ii. question. Midland 
T-k 'p l •n.L' C.:n;>:.].v i.:en:o<! into Utah Tele-
phone r 'o ia j . ' . rv ;,M«t the surviving corporat ion 
* (j): the i;;\ i '< *' •'»1iii r peH«' i »^ f- '*on.-
Commission and accounting methods ap-
proved by it, including the joining with 
other subsidiaries of Continental in filing 
its consolidated federal income tax return. 
The steps taken in computation, payment, 
and intersystem accounting of the consoli-
dated federal income tax by Continental 
for each of the years in question are al-
lowable under federal law. Pursuant to a 
closing agreement with the Internal Reve-
nue Service, (hereinafter called I.R.S.) the 
consolidated federal return of Continental 
and its subsidiaries is prepared on a 
"separate company'' basis, with Continen-
tal acting as an agent for each subsidiary 
in dealings with the I.R.S. Continental 
files a declaration of estimated taxes, re-
mits quarterly payments, and at the end 
of the tax year files the return and pays 
any remaining tax, all on a consolidated 
basis. 
Each of the subsidiaries, including Mid-
land and Utah, computes its declaration of 
estimated federal taxes separately at the 
beginning of the tax year and remits its 
quarterly payments to Continental. At the 
close of the tax year, the federal taxable 
income is computed by each subsidiary for 
itself as a separate corporation, and each 
subsidiary forwards these figures to Conti-
nental for preparation of the consolidated 
return, together with any further payment 
that would be due on a separate company 
basis. Remittances of all members of the 
Continental group are made by actual trans-
fers of funds and are not merely account-
ing entries. Continental's preparation of 
the consolidated return involves combining 
the separately computed net taxable in-
comes of each subsidiary with the net op-
erating losses of other subsidiaries. Under 
present federal law, the filing of a consoli-
dated return permits an economically relat-
ed group of corporations to report on a ba-
sis of transactions entered into with outsid-
ers, which means, in general, gain or loss 
on intercompany transactions between the 
piny of Utah. For clarity herein the plain-
tiffs ar« referred to as on the tax returns of 
concern in this case. 
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related corporations is eliminated from in-
come of the reporting corporation.2 
In the taxable years in issue here, the 
net amount due the I.R.S. under Continen-
tal's consolidated return was less than the 
sum of all the tax payments remitted sepa-
rately to that company by the profit pro-
ducing members of the Continental group. 
This was because some of the Continental 
subsidiaries had operating losses, so that 
the consolidated income of the Continental 
group totalled less than the incomes report-
ed by the profit making subsidiaries, in-
cluding these two plaintiffs. 
When any current operating loss is uti-
lized, Continental remits funds to that 
member, to the extent of the tax effect of 
the loss which could have been carried 
back to prior years under the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1954, if that member had 
filed a separate return with the I.R.S. 
The effect of any remaining unused por-
tion of net operating loss is offset as to 
that member in the future and, thereafter, 
Continental remits funds to such member 
at the then current tax rate. The result is 
that any newly acquired loss incurring sub-
sidiary, while its losses are used to offset 
current total group net taxable income, 
does not immediately receive a refund 
from Continental, but only upon establish-
ing a pattern of profits is a refund then 
remitted to such a subsidiary based on its 
losses. 
In the computation by plaintiffs of their 
Utah tax for each of the years in question, 
each deducted federal taxes in an amount 
computed by multiplying its taxable in-
come, separately computed, by the then 
current federal income tax rate, less the ( 
appropriate amount of Federal investment-
credit earned,3 and deducted that amount 
on its Utah tax return. Upon separate au-
dits by the Tax Commission staff, the fol-
lowing tax deficiencies were assessed: 
UTAH TELEPHONE COMPANY 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Proportionate 
Share of Fed. 
Tax Liab. 
$35,415.52 
27,205.00 
9,777.00 
-0-
15,749.00 
40,921.00 
Fed. Tax 
Deducted on 
Utah Return 
$57,219.54 
48,979.00 
8,375.00 
26,750.00 
Over or (Under 
Deducted) 
Difference 
21,804.02 
21,774.00 
(1,402.00) 
(14,171.00) 
MIDLAND TELEPHONE COMPANY 
46,000.00 
44,259.00 
45,322.00 
26,157.00 
24,802.00 
-0-
91,250.00 
75,572.00 
90,491.00 
86,288.00 
54,573.00 
-0-
45,250.00 
31,313.00 
45,169.00 
60,131.00 
29,771.00 
Assessed Utah 
Tax Deficiency 
(Refund) 
$1,308.24 
1,306.44 
($85.20) 
None 
369.84 
($850.26) 
2,577.91 
1,758.60 
2,560.40 
3,372.48 
1,688.28 
-0-
2. See generally Treas.Reg.Secs. 1.1502-11 
through 1.15G4-1 and particularly Treas.Reg. 
Sec. 1.1502-13, J. Chommie, The Law of 
Federal Income Taxation 292 (2d Ed.1973). 
3. Sec. 3S of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 allows taxpayers who make "qualified 
investments" (basically depreciable property 
539 P 2d—29 
other than buildings and their structural 
components) a credit against tax liability. 
Section 4G of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 generally provides in the case of public 
utility companies for a credit of 4% of the 
amount of such investments for the year such 
property is placed in service. 
Nos. 13842 & 13S43 
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In order to arrive at an equitable adjust-
ment of the tax deduction allowable to the 
plaintiffs for payment of federal income 
taxes, the Commission allowed such deduc-
tion on the ratio that the federal taxable 
income of each profit producing subsidiary 
bears to the total taxable income of all 
profit producing subsidiaries. 
The Tax Commission is by our constitu-
tion endowed with authority to " . 
administer and supervise the tax laws of 
the State . . . and . . . such 
other powers as may be prescribed by the 
Legislature;"4 and this is implemented by 
statute, " . . . to perform such fur-
ther duties as may be imposed upon it by 
law, and exercise all powers necessary in 
the performance of its duties."5 
In dealing with the computation of net 
income in the determination of corporate 
franchise taxes, the legislature has pro-
vided for several classes of deductions 
from gross income, Section 59-13-7, U.C. 
A. 1953: 
[1,2] In computing net income there 
shall be allowed as deductions: 
* * * * * * 
Taxes Paid 
(3) Taxes paid or accrued within the 
taxable year, except— 
(a) Taxes imposed by this chapter; 
and, 
(b) Taxes assessed against local bene-
fits of a kind tending to increase the 
value of the property assessed; pro-
vided, that so much of taxes are properly 
allocable to maintenance or interest 
charges may be deducted. 
While the general rule as to taxing stat-
utes is that they are construed strictly 
against the taxing authority and favorably 
to the taxpayer, the reverse is true as to 
provisions allowing deductions. It is 
usually held that deductions are allowed as 
4. Art. XI I I , See. 11, Utah Const. 
5. Sec. 59-5-40, U.C.A.1953. 
6. Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 78 
S.Ct. 512, 2 L.Ed.2d 559. 
a matter of grace and therefore should be 
strictly construed.6 In accordance with 
that rule, the taxpayer is required to show-
that his claim is fairly and clearly allowa-
ble under the terms of the statute.7 
The Tax Commission does not question 
that Section 59-13-7(3), U.GA. 1953, just 
quoted includes whatever federal taxes are 
paid as a proper deduction to plaintiff 
corporation. But the dispute here centers 
upon what constitutes "taxes paid" for 
purposes of qualifying for the deduction. 
In an effort to deal with the complexi-
ties which arise in the allocation of deduc-
tions for various types of corporate struc-
tures, the Legislature has provided in Sec-
tion 59-13-17, U.C.A. 1953: 
Allocation of income and deductions 
between several corporations controlled 
by the same interests.—In any case of 
two or more corporations (whether or 
not organized or doing business in this 
state, and whether or not affiliated) 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by the same interests, the tax commis-
sion is authorized to distribute, apportion 
or allocate gross income or deductions 
between or among such corporations, if 
it determines that such distribution, ap-
portionment or allocation is necessary in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or 
clearly to reflect the income of any of 
such corporations. [Emphasis added.] 
The plaintiffs seek to justify their proce-
dure by comparing rulings upon corporate 
taxation by the I.R.S. and the federal 
courts. They point out that the section 
just quoted is essentially the same in word-
ing as Section 482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954. They note that the federal 
courts in construing Section 482 have inter-
preted that section to permit only the re-
allocation of incomes or deductions among 
the various members of an affiliated 
group and that federal courts have not 
7. Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 
319 U.S. 590, G3 S.Ct. 3279, 87 L.Ed. 1607. 
CONTINENTAL TELEPHONE CO. OP UTAH v. STATE TAX COM'N Utah 4 5 1 
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j section 482 to he used to disallow 
•••/lions but have relied upon the provi-
uf Section 269 of the Internal Reve-
</ode of 1954 when disallowing deduc-
. . which did not appear to clearly re-
... the income of affiliated corporations.8 
3 4] Where there is doubt or uncer-
. • :v concerning the interpretation and ap-
...::,»n of statutes, they should be viewed 
;;^ht of the condition and necessities 
.••:v-h they are intended to meet and the 
v.cts sought to be attained thereby.9 We 
. -rik the broad wording of Section 59-13-
•~ :::dicates a legislative intent to cover all 
::...tions dealing with either direct or in-
:ri-ct corporate affiliates without regard 
-. whether they file individual state or 
. .:>< ilidated state corporate franchise tax 
•rtv.rns; and that the language of that sec-
•:.»:i authorizes the Tax Commission to so 
.; portion income and deductions of corpo-
'.ittuns within such controlled groups as to 
:.tirly and equitably reflect the income 
.irned in Utah.10 
• |5] In the instant case, the key fact is 
'".at not all the "federal tax payments" re-
ined to the parent corporation by its 
rentable subsidiaries, and particularly not 
;a- amounts remitted by these two plain-
••M'S, reach the federal treasury as tax 
-.tynicnts. A portion of each payment is 
Averted by the parent corporation to its 
arious subsidiaries that are suffering op-
rating losses, allowing such subsidiaries to 
-tain current use of their net operating 
»*>es rather than to await profitable years 
"'un such net operating losses could be 
•«i'ried forward and deducted from net in-
come at that time. This in effect repre-
sents a transfer of credit for current in-
come earned by plaintiffs in Utah to out of 
state subsidiaries of Continental. Quite 
clearly, since some of the out of state sub-
sidiaries are operating at a deficit, they do 
not pay any tax on such transfers, either 
in Utah or the states in which they operate, 
and hence such income earned in Utah 
would completely escape Utah state taxa-
tion, if the plaintiffs' position were to 
prevail. We agree with the view of the 
Tax Commission that our statutes do not 
contemplate such a transfer as a deduction 
from net state income unless such pay-
ments are actually paid to the federal gov-
ernment. 
[6] It is further our opinion that the 
fair and reasonable interpretation of the 
term "taxes paid" in Section 59-13-7(3) is 
that it means a deduction for taxes paid or 
accrued which are actually paid or accrue 
to the taxing entity (I.R.S.); and it does 
not mean sums which are merely trans-
ferred to a foreign corporation or foreign 
subsidiaries purportedly for that purpose.11 
In conformity with what we have said 
herein, it is our conclusion that the appor-
tionment of the amount of "federal taxes 
paid," according to the formula above re-
cited is within the prerogative and duty of 
the Tax Commission and that its decision 
should be and is hereby affirmed. No 
costs awarded. 
ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, 
JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, C. J., concurs in the result. 
V'nnmissioner v. First Security Bank of 
' t"K 405 I \ S . 394, 92 S.Ct. 1085. 31 L.Ed. 
-^ ' i l s ; Bittker & Eustiee, Federal Income 
Iiv.ition of Corporations and Shareholders, 
IM'. 15-21 through 15-30 (3d Ed.1971). 
I nited States Smelting, Refining <(• Milling 
'"• '\ L'tah Power cG Light Co., 58 Utah 168, 
I-»T P . 9 0 2 . 
>• Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax 
r
'»«mission, 27 Utah 2d 119, 493 P.2d 632. 
)v* note here that Sees. 269 and 482 of the 
•nal Revenue Code of 1954 deal with 
problems of attempt to evade corporate 
taxes on a national scale by acquiring sub-
sidiaries for the principal purpose of taking 
advantage of losses. There is no such con-
tention or issue involved here. 
II. Accord, see Trunk-Hue Gas Company v. 
Collector of Revenue, La.App., 182" So.2d 
674. affd., 248 La. 1101, 1S4 So.2d 25 ; 
contra Cities Service Gas Company v. Mc-
Donald, 204 Kan. 705, 466 P.2d 277; but 
each decision is highly dependent on the 
particular state statutes involved. 
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I would therefore simply reverse the 
judgment rendered and award costs to the 
appellant. 
and Public Welfare 
rw 101 KEY NUMBER SYSTEM) } 
CONTINENTAL OIL COMPANY, a 
Delaware Corporation, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION of Utah and 
Fred L. Forsyth, Defendants. 
No. 14699. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 5, 1977. 
Unemployment compensation claimant 
applied for unemployment benefits after he 
was terminated by his employer solely on 
basis of his driving record. He was de-
clared ineligible for period of six weeks on 
ground he was discharged for misconduct 
connected with his work, and he appealed. 
The appeals referee affirmed, and he ap-
pealed. The Board of Review reversed the 
decision of appeals referee, and employer 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Maughan, 
J., held that: (1) Board of Review was not 
required to affirm determination of appeals 
referee if there was any competent evi-
dence to sustain his findings, and (2) evi-
dence supported Board of Review's finding 
that claimant was not discharged for mis-
conduct when he was terminated by his 
employer because of two accidents in which 
he received citation by investigating officer 
for driving under influence of intoxicant 
since element of wilfulness, or wantonness, 
or equal culpability was not apparent. 
Affirmed. 
1. Social Security 
e=*571 
Two moving traffic violations not dis-
covered until after unemployment compen-
sation claimant had been terminated by his 
employer solely on basis of his driving rec-
ord could not be considered as evidence to 
support reason for his termination. 
2. Social Security and Public Welfare 
e=> 620.25 
Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission did not act in appellate capacity 
and was not required under unemployment 
compensation statute to affirm determina-
tion of appeals referee if there was any 
competent evidence to sustain his findings. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-4-1 et seq., 35-4-10(d)(?), 
(i). 
3. Social Security and Public Welfare 
c=>651 
Under unemployment compensation 
statute, role of Supreme Court was to sus-
tain determination of Board of Review, un-
less record clearly and persuasively proved 
action of Board was arbitrary, capricious 
and unreasonable, or specifically, determi-
nation was wrong as matter of law because 
only opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from facts. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-10(i). 
4. Statutes <3=*184 
When ambiguity exists as to meaning 
of statutory term, general purpose and ob-
ject of legislature in enacting statute 
should be ascertained and term should be 
construed in accordance with it. 
5. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<3=>252 
Purpose of unemployment compensa-
tion statute was to cushion effect of unem-
ployment by payment of benefits to worker 
in event of his unemployment. U.C.A.1953, 
35-4-1 et seq. 
6. Social Security and Public Welfare 
c=>620.25 
Without finding of culpability, determi-
nation of appeals referee that unemploy-
ment compensation claimant, who was ter-
minated by his employer because of two 
accidents in which he received citation by 
investigating officer for driving under in-
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fluence of intoxicant, was discharged for 
misconduct connected with his work was 
wrong as matter of law. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-
5(b)(1). 
7. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=> 584.5 
Evidence supported Board of Review's 
finding that unemployment compensation 
claimant was not discharged for misconduct 
when he was terminated by his employer 
because of two accidents in which he re-
ceived citation by investigating officer for 
driving under influence of intoxicant, since 
element of wilfulness, or wantonness, or 
equal culpability was not apparent; there-
fore claimant was not ineligible for unem-
ployment benefits for period of six weeks 
on ground that he was discharged for mis-
conduct connected with his work. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-4-5(b)(l). 
John W. Lowe of Brayton, Lowe & Hur-
ley, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Floyd G. 
Astin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendants. 
MAUGHAN, Justice. 
Plaintiff, Continental Oil Company, peti-
tioned this court for review of an order of 
the Board of Review determining that Fred 
L. Forsyth was not ineligible for unemploy-
ment compensation. We affirm the deci-
sion of the Board of Review. All statutory 
references are to U.C.A.1953. 
Forsyth was employed by plaintiff as a 
district sales representative from June 1968 
until February 11,1976, when he wras termi-
nated solely for his driving record. Forsyth 
travelled approximately 25,000 miles per 
year in the conduct of his employer's busi-
ness. He was furnished a company auto-
mobile for this purpose. 
After his discharge, he applied for unem-
ployment benefits. He was declared ineli-
gible for a period of six weeks, on the 
ground he was discharged for misconduct 
connected with his work, Section 35-4-
5(b)(1). He appealed from this determina-
tion, and a hearing was held before an 
appeals referee. The referee also found 
Forsyth ineligible for benefits for a period 
of six weeks. In an appeal to the Board of 
Review, the decision of the appeals referee 
was reversed, on the ground the evidence 
failed to support the finding Forsyth's dis-
charge was for misconduct. Continental 
appeals, urging the decision of the appeals 
referee should be reinstated. 
On February 4, 1976, Forsyth went to a 
private club for entertainment purposes 
with some of the personnel of Continental. 
Included in the group were some of his 
supervisors, who were visiting from out of 
town. Continental paid his membership 
fees for this club and accepted his charges 
as items on his expense account. The per-
sonnel in the group also drove company 
vehicles. Alcoholic beverages were drunk 
at this gathering. Forsyth remained at the 
club from approximately 4:30 p. m. until 
7:00 p. m. He left to get his wife; for they 
were to attend a company banquet that 
evening. 
While driving to his residence Forsyth 
was involved in an accident. He testified it 
was snowing, and the roads were slippery. 
The driver in front of him attempted to 
make a right turn into her driveway; she 
slipped past the driveway, Forsyth was un-
able to stop, and collided with her. The 
investigating officer arrested Forsyth for 
"driving under the influence." His trial on 
this charge was held subsequent to the 
hearing before the referee, and he was ac-
quitted. 
A copy of the investigating officer's re-
port was directed to plaintiff's regional 
manager. The report revealed Forsyth was 
driving on a restricted license. He had 
been involved in a single vehicle collision on 
February 3, 1975, at which time he was 
charged and subsequently convicted for 
"driving under the influence." Forsyth's 
license had been revoked, but he had been 
issued a restricted license permitting him to 
drive in connection with his work and for 
emergencies. 
Forsyth had not reported this accident to 
his employer, but the referee found Cent-
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nental did not promulgate a definite writ-
ten policy requiring such reports; until 
February 27, 1975. Forsyth testified he did 
not report the accident, because he had just 
previously been awarded the company's 
five-year safety award for driving. This 
first accident had also occurred after For-
syth had attended a company party, includ-
ing supervisory personnel. After the com-
pany received knowledge of these two acci-
dents, it checked its records and discovered 
Forsyth had been involved in a minor acci-
dent in August 1975; which was found not 
to be his fault. On February 11, 1976, he 
was terminated solely on the basis of his 
driving record. 
[1] At the hearing before the referee, 
plaintiff presented evidence indicating For-
syth had been issued two moving traffic 
violations, one in 1973, and one in 1974. 
However, these citations were not discover-
ed until March 25, 1976, approximately one 
and one-half months after Forsyth had 
been discharged; therefore, they cannot be 
considered as evidence to support the rea-
son for his termination. 
The appeals referee found the cause of 
Forsyth's dismissal was his driving record; 
specifically, the two accidents in which he 
received a citation by the investigating offi-
cer for driving under the influence of an 
intoxicant. The finding was: 
. . . Conduct contrary to the best 
interests of the employer in the operation 
of this vehicle demonstrates an indiffer-
ence or disregard of the employee's duty 
to his employer which constitutes a 
breach of his duties and obligations aris-
ing out of the contract of employment, 
and comprises misconduct in connection 
with his work. 
Thereafter, the Board of Review con-
sidered the record and testimony before the 
referee. In the interim Forsyth was acquit-
ted of the driving under the influence 
charge. In reversing the referee, the Board 
stated they considered the length of claim-
ant's employment, the fact he drove 25,000 
miles per year, his prior driving citations, 
and his acquittal. The Board found claim-
ant may have used poor judgment in not 
reporting his accident in February 1975. 
However the company had no well defined 
procedure requiring such report until a time 
subsequent to that accident. The Board of 
Review ruled: 
. The company could very well 
have had good cause in terminating the 
claimant; however, the evidence fails to 
support a finding that his discharge was 
for misconduct. 
[2] Plaintiff contends the Board of Re-
view should be required to affirm the deter-
mination of the appeals referee, if there be 
any competent evidence to sustain his find-
ings. Plaintiff cites Section 35—4—10(i), and 
claims the Board of Review acts in an ap-
pellate capacity and should therefore ad-
here to the standard in the statute that the 
findings of fact are conclusive if supported 
by the evidence. 
The specific provisions of Chapter 4, Title 
35, do not sustain plaintiff's argument. 
The significant provisions of Section 35-
4-10(i) provide: 
In any judicial proceeding 
under this section the findings of the 
commission and the board of review as to 
the facts if supported by evidence shall 
be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said 
court shall be confined to questions of 
law. . [Emphasis added.] 
In contrast, the power of the Board of 
Review is set forth in Section 35-4-10(d)(2): 
. . . Upon appeal the board of re-
view may on the basis of the evidence 
previously submitted in such case, or 
upon the basis of such additional evidence 
as it may direct be taken, affirm, modify 
or reverse the findings, conclusions and 
decision of the appeal referee. . 
[3] Under Section 35-4-10(i), the role of 
this court is to sustain the determination of 
the Board of Review, unless the record 
clearly and persuasively proves the action 
of the Board was arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of 
law, the determination was wrong; because 
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only the opposite conclusion could be drawn 
from the facts.1 
Plaintiff contends Forsyth was dis-
charged for misconduct connected with his 
work. Chapter 4, Title 35, does not define 
the term "misconduct," nor do we have 
decisional law which does so howrever, we 
are not without aid in reaching our decision. 
[4] In Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck,2 the 
court wTas confronted with the meaning of 
"misconduct" in an unemployment compen-
sation statute. The court observed that 
under common usage the term "miscon-
duct" has several meanings which equally 
could be within the scope of the statute. 
When such an ambiguity exists, the general 
purpose and object of the legislature in 
enacting the statute should be ascertained 
and the term should be construed in accord-
ance with it. 
[5] The purpose of the statute was to 
cushion the effect of unemployment by the 
payment of benefits to a worker in the 
event of his unemployment. These pay-
ments were to accrue to all covered work-
ers, who were "eligible," under the statute. 
However, an employee was not eligible if he 
had been discharged for misconduct con-
nected with his work. Thus the benefits 
acquired by an employee could be lost in 
case of his discharge for misconduct. The 
provision, when it is operative, has the ef-
fect of a penalty or forfeiture on the em-
ployee. In Boynton the court stated: 
. If mere mistakes, errors in 
judgment or in the exercise of discretion, 
minor and but casual or unintentional 
carelessness or negligence, and similar 
minor peccadilloes must be considered to 
be within the term 'misconduct', and no 
such element as wantonness, culpability 
or wilfulness with wrongful intent or evil 
design is to be included as an essential 
1. Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Utah, 567 P.2d 626 
(1977). 
2. 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636, 640 (1941). 
3. This definition has been widely adopted or 
applied in many jurisdictions. See May-wood 
Glass Co. v. Stewart, 170 Cdl App 2d 719, 339 
element in order to constitute misconduct 
within the intended meaning of the term 
as used in the statute, then there will be 
defeated, as to many of the great mass of 
less capable industrial workers, who are 
in the lowrer income brackets and for 
whose benefit the act was largely de-
signed, the principal purpose and object 
under the act of alleviating the evils of 
unemployment by cushioning the shock of 
a lay-off, which is apt to be most serious 
to such workers. 
The court further said a statute for a 
forfeiture should be strictly construed, and 
an ambiguous or doubtful term should be 
given a construction which is least likely to 
work a forfeiture. The penal character of 
the provision should be minimized by ex-
cluding, rather than including, conduct not 
clearly intended to be within the provision. 
Based on the foregoing principles, it was 
the opinion of the court: 
. the intended meaning of the 
term 'misconduct' . . . is limited to 
conduct evincing such wilful or wanton 
disregard of an employer's interests as is 
found in deliberate violations or disregard 
of standards of behavior which the em-
ployer has the right to expect of his em-
ployee, or in carelessness or negligence of 
such degree or recurrence as to manifest 
equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil 
design, or to show an intentional and 
substantial disregard of the employer's 
interest or of the employee's duties and 
obligations to his employer. On the other 
hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory 
conduct, failure in good performance as 
the result of inability or incapacity, inad-
vertencies or ordinary negligence in iso-
lated instances, or good faith errors in 
judgment or discretion are not to be 
deemed 'misconduct' within the meaning 
of the statute.3 
P.2d 947 (1959); Gaunce v. Board of Labor 
Appeals, Emp. Sec. Div., 164 Mont. 445, 524 
P.2d 1108, In re Employees of Edgewater Inn 
10 Wash.App. 437, 517 P.2d 973 (1974), Mitch-
ell v. Lovmgton Good Samaritan Center, S** 
N.M. 575, 555 P.2d 696 (1976); Employ mer.i 
Security Commission v. Myers, 17 Anz App 
AM. CAS. CO. OF REDDING v. EAGLE STAR INS 
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Also in accord is Jacobs v. California Un-
employment Insurance Appeals Board* the 
court stated that the test of misconduct is 
essentially volitional. 
. The conduct may be harmful 
to the employer's interests and justify the 
employee's discharge; nevertheless, it 
evokes the disqualification for unemploy-
ment benefits only if it is wilful, wanton 
or equally culpable.5 
Utah 731 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
REDDING, PENNSYLVANIA and Lar-
ry Richards Silver, Administrator of the 
Estate of Lynn Richards Silver, De-
ceased, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
[6,7] In the matter before us, the ap-
peals referee did not find Forsyth's conduct 
evinced a deliberate, wilful, or wanton dis-
regard of his employer's interest. He found 
conduct contrary to the best interests of the 
employer demonstrating indifference or dis-
regard of the employees duty, thus constitu-
ting a breach of that duty and comprising 
misconduct. The intent of Forsyth was not 
specifically considered by the referee; with-
out a finding of culpability, the determina-
tion of misconduct was wrong as a matter 
of law. The Board of Review characterized 
Forsyth's conduct as indicating poor judg-
ment, but it construed the evidence as in-
sufficient to support a finding of miscon-
duct. The element of wilfulness, or wan-
tonness, or equal culpability was not appar-
ent. 
A review of the record reveals the credi-
ble evidence and reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from it will support opposing find-
ings as to Forsyth's intent. In such a case, 
the finding of the Board of Review is con-
clusive, and its determination is sustained. 
ELLETT, C. J., and CROCKETT, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
87, 495 P.2d 857 (1972); Barnum v. Williams, 
84 Nev. 37, 436 P.2d 219 (1968); Jacobs V. 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals 
Board, 25 Cal.App. 1035, 102 Cal.Rptr. 364; 
26 A.L.R 3d 1356, Sec. 3, p. 1359. 
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY, 
LTD., Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14800. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 8, 1977. 
Plaintiff insurer sought declaratory 
judgment that it had no liability in plane 
crash killing four persons because its policy 
covering plane's passengers was secondary 
and policy issued by defendant insurer was 
primary. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Stewart N. Hanson, Sr., J., 
entered summary judgment for plaintiff in-
surer, and defendant insurer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that un-
der policy excepting coverage of "operating 
the aircraft under the terms of any agree-
ment which provides any remuneration for 
the use of said aircraft", use of aircraft by 
president of electrical company which was 
required to pay all expenses of operation 
maintenance and storage and its pro rata 
share of premiums was so "remunerated" 
and, thus, defendant insurer was exempted 
from liability in connection with plane crash 
occurring when plane was being flown in 
course of business of electric company. 
Vacated. 
1. Insurance s=>435.37 
Under policy covering airplane's pas-
sengers but excepting coverage of "operat-
ing Ihfc aira&il vmiteT lbs ierrns of any 
agreement which provides any remunera-
tion for the use of said aircraft.", primary 
meaning of term "remuneration" would be 
to pay an equivalent for, i. e., in the sense 
of reimbursing for a service, loss or ex-
4. Note 3, supra. 
5. At p. 366 of 102 Cal Rptr. 
ACQUITTAL 
ACQUIRE. To gain by any means, usually by 
one's own exertions; to get as one's own; to ob-
tain by search, endeavor, practice, or purchase; 
receive or gain in whatever manner; come to 
have. Clarno v. Gamble-Robinson Co., 190 Minn. 
256, 251 N.W. 26S, 269. 
In law of contracts and of descents, to become owner of 
p r o p e r t y ; to make property one's own. Crutehficld v. 
Johnson & La t imer . 213 Ala. 73. S So.2d 412. To gain 
ownersh ip of. 'Commissioner of Insurance v. Broad Street 
Mut. Casual ty Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 261, 44 N.E.Cd GS3. 6S4. 
Broad meaning including both purchase and construct ion; 
acquisi t ion being the act of getting or obtaining some-
th ing which niay be already in existence, or may be 
b rough t into existence through means 'employed to acquire 
it. Ronnow v. City of Las Vegas. 57 Nov. 332. 65 P.2d 133, 
140. Sometimes used in the sense of * "procure." Jol ly v. 
McCoy. 3G Cal.App. 479. 172 P. CIS. 619. It does not nec-
essar i ly mean tha t t i t le has passed. Godwin v. Tut t le . 70 
Or. 424*. 141 P. 1120. 1122. Includes taking by devise. U. S. 
v. Merr iam. 263 U.S. 179. 44 S.Ct. G9, 70 GS L.Ed. 240, 29 
A.L.Pw. 1547. 
ACQUIRED. To get, procure, secure, acquire. 
Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469. 72 S.W.2d 260, 
263. 
Coming to an Intestate in any other way than by gift, 
devise, or descent from a parent or the ancestor of a par-
ent . In re Miller 's Will, 2 Lea (Ter.n.) 51. 
ACQUIRED RIGHTS. Thoso which a man does 
•not naturally enjoy, but which are owing to his 
own procurement, as sovereignty, or the right of 
commanding, or the right of property. Borden v. 
State, 11 Ark. 519, 527, 44 Am.Dec. 217. 
ACQUIRER TAX. German estate inheritance leg-
acy tax, not true inheritance or legacy tax, im-
posed upon recipient, and not affecting executors. 
In re Gotthelf's Will, 273 N.Y.S. 247, 152 Misc. 309. 
ACQUISITIOX. The act of becoming the owner 
of certain property; the act by wliich one ac-
quires or procures the property in anything. State 
ex rel. Fisher v. Sherman, 135 Ohio St. 45S, 21 N. 
E.2d 467, 470. Used also of the thine: acquired. 
Hart igan v. City of Los Angeles, 170 Cal. 313, 
149 P. 590, 592. Taking with, or against, consent. 
Scribner v. Wikstrom, 93 N.H. 17, 34 A.2d 658, 
660. Especially a material possession obtained by 
anv means. Jones v. State, 126 Tex.Cr.R. 469, 7*2 
S.\V.2d 260, 263. 
Original acquisition !s tha t by which a man secures a 
p rope r ty in a t h i n s wliich Is not at the time he acquires 
it. and in its then exist ing condition, the proper ty of any 
o ther individual. I t may result from occupancy: 2 Kent. 
2S0: accession; 2 Kent, 293: intellectual labor—namely, 
for inventions, which are secured by patent r igh t s ; and 
for the au thorsh ip of books, maps, and charts , which is 
protec ted by copyr igh t s ; 1 Bouv.Inst. 50S. n. 
Derivative acquisitions are those which are procured 
from others . Goods and chattels may chancre owners by 
act of law in the cases of forfeiture, succession, marr iage, 
judgment , insolvency, and intestacy; or by act of the 
par t ies , as by gift or sale. 
An acquisit ion niay result from the act of the par ty him-
self, or those who are in his power acting fr-r him. as his 
chi ldren while minor s ; Gale v. Parrot , 1 N.II. 28. See 
Dig. 41. 1. 53; Inst . 2. 9. 3. 
See Accession. 
ACQUIT. To set free, release or discharge as 
from an obligation, burden or accusation. Com-
monwealth v. Benson, 94 Pa.Super. 10. 15. To ab-
| solve, one from an obligation or a liability; or to 
legally certify the innocence of one charged with 
crime! Dolloway v. Turrill, 26 Wend.N.Y. 383, 
400. 
ACQUIT A CAUTION. The certificate proving 
receipt of security that goods shipped from one 
French port to another shall not be sent to a 
foreign country. Argles, Fr.Merc.Law, 543. 
ACQUIT BACK. In mineral deed, vested in the 
grantee the title to such mineral rights as grantor 
I had at time of execution of deed, where grantor 
had received his title from grantee and the ex-
pression was intended to reconvev such title. Al-
len v. Boykin, 199 Miss. 417, 21 So.2d 74S, 750. 
I ACQUITMENT. See Absolution. 
ACQUITTAL. 
Contracts 
A release, absolution, or discharge from an ob-
ligation, liability, or engagement. 
According to Lord Coke, there are three kinds of acquit-
tal, namely : by deed, when the par ty releases the obliga-
t ion; by prescript ion; by tenure ; Co. Li'tt. 100 a. 
Crimes 
The legal and formal certification of the inno-
cence of a person who has been charged with 
crime; a deliverance or setting free a person 
from a charge of guilt. 
In a narrow sense, it is the absolution of a par ty accused 
on a trial before a traverse jury. Thomas v. De Graf-
I fenreid. 2 N<>u & McC. (S. C> 143. Proper ly speaking, 
however, one is not acquitted by the jury but by the judg-
1 ment of the court. People v. Rogers. 170 N.Y.S. 86. 87, 
102 Misc. 437. And he may be legally acquitted by a judg-
ment rendered otherwise than in pursuance of a verdict, 
] as where he is discharged by a magistrate because of the 
insuiliciency of the evidence, or the indictment is dismissed 
by the court or a nol. pros, entered. State v. Hart , 90 N.J . 
Law 261. 101 A. 278. But. compare State v. Smith, 170 N.C. 
742: 87 S.E. <AS. 99. 
"Nol. p ros ." not equivalent of "acqui t t a l . " Bolton v. 
State . 160 Miss. 290. 146 So. 453. 454. The unnecessary dis-
j charge of the ju ry without the consent of the accused after 
| it has been sworn may constitute an acquittal. Riley v. 
I Commonwealth. 190 Ky. 204. 227 S.W. 146. 147. Acquit tal 
| discharges from guilt, pardon only from punishment . 
Younger v. State. 2 YV.Ya. 579, 9S Am.Dec. 791. 
It may occur even though the question of guilt or inno-
cence has never been submitted to a jury, as where a 
defendant, having been held under an indictment or infor-
mal ion. is discharged because not brought to trial wi thin 
the time provided by the Criminal Code. State v. Taylor , | 130 Kan. 813. 288 P. 731, 732. 
Acquittals in fact are those which take place when the 
jury , upon trial, finds a verdict of not guilty. 
Acquitt'ils in law are those which take place by mere 
operation of law; as whore a man has been charged 
merely as an assessory. and the principal has been acquit-
ted. 2 Co.Inst. 361. Ccmpare State v. Walton, 1S6 N.C. 
485. 119 S.K. 886, 888. 
See Jeopardy; Autrefois Acquit; Convict. 
Feudal Law 
The obligation on the part of a mesne lord to 
protect his tenant from any claims, entries or 
molestations by lords paramount arising out of 
the services due to them by the mesne lord. See 
Co.Litt. 100a. 
